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 From Saumur to L. (S.): Tracing the 
Theory and Concept of Religious 
Freedom under Canadian Law 
Faisal Bhabha* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Religious freedom under the Canadian Constitution1 has received 
sustained attention over the past 30 years but remains a concept in search 
of a theory. Cases have tended to be dealt with in one of two ways: either 
as religious claims in tension with government objectives in policy or 
law, or as religious claims that risk harm to others, or exact a cost or 
benefit from others. The test, as set by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the paradigmatic judgment in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,2 calls for a 
non-evaluative identification of the claimant’s religious belief or prac-
tice. A claimant need only establish a subjective, sincerely held belief in 
order to attract the protection of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms3 or human rights law. Under existing doctrine, no limits are 
imposed on the potential scope of protected beliefs or activities. The 
primary limiting principle of religious accommodation is the “undue 
hardship” test in statutory human rights4 or the section 1 “Oakes test” 
                                                                                                             
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. An earlier version of 
this paper was solicited for, and presented at, the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s Creed 
Consultation in March 2012. The author benefited from the efforts of Commission staff and the 
feedback from workshop participants. He is also indebted to Ben Berger, Jamie Cameron, Sonia 
Lawrence, Danny Priel, Adam Shinar, Bruce Ryder and Diana Younes for insightful conversations 
and comments, and is grateful to Simran Bakshi and Adrienne Lipsey for their superb research 
assistance. 
1 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2 [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem”]. 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4 See British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Co-
lumbia Government and Service Employees’ Union, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Meiorin”]. 
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for Charter cases.5 In Amselem and Multani v. Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys6 the Supreme Court of Canada did not find 
convincing justificatory arguments under section 1; in Alberta v. Hutte-
rian Brethren of Wilson Colony7 it did. These cases were decided under a 
doctrine of accommodation that conceives of only practical limits to 
freedom. Derived from a liberal theory of justice in which maximum 
individual autonomy is paramount, any need to limit freedom within the 
accommodation framework is conceptualized as a practical obstacle 
created by the inconveniences of social life. Pure, or idealized, freedom 
is unrestrained; practical freedom requires balancing competing interests 
and rights. 
It is this paper’s contention that accommodation analysis proves a 
shaky framework for adjudicating religious freedom issues that involve 
deep normative disputes in which a variety of social interests are at play. 
In some cases, for example, government action may seek to compel the 
promotion of a particular norm — such as acceptance of others — that 
may be contrary to the deeply held views of an individual or group. 
When this happens, religious freedom’s intersection with equality and 
other constitutional values, such as multiculturalism and minority 
protection, suggest a more holistic conception of freedom that accounts 
for relational interests. While accommodation often demands special 
treatment, constitutional and public values may not warrant affording 
such treatment to all religious claims. The specific impact of Amselem 
was limited, but the analysis used to create the accommodation exception 
generated doctrinal instability, and dangerous indeterminacy in the 
potential scope and singularity of future claims. Courts are often com-
pelled to consider content and normativity when considering claims of 
religious freedom, despite the law’s efforts to render religion “neutral”.8 
This paper’s discussion of the recent Supreme Court decision in 
L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes9 illustrates how the govern-
                                                                                                             
5 Proportionality is at the heart of Canada’s Charter analysis, with government afforded an 
opportunity to limit virtually any right or freedom on the basis of it being demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
6 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
7 [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. 
8 See Benjamin Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
277, at 281 [hereinafter “Berger, ‘Law’s Religion’”], arguing that adjudicating religion is never 
value neutral. See also Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 710, at para. 130 (S.C.C.), foretelling the doctrinal challenge of adjudicating competing 
values: “In an instance where belief claims seem to conflict, there will be a need to strike a balance, 
either by defining the rights so as to avoid a conflict or within a s. 1 justification.” 
9 [2012] S.C.J. No. 7, 2012 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “L. (S.)”]. 
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ment action at issue — a multi-faith and ethics educational program 
designed to promote secular-egalitarian values that were in tension with 
the values of the claimants in the case — would have been vulnerable 
under the scrutiny of established religious accommodation law. For this 
reason, this paper warns that the Amselem framework proves untenable, 
for it invites a potentially limitless range of individual accommodation 
claims without any workable and transparent mechanism for reviewing, 
and judging, the content of those claims. In some cases, a specific 
government objective might justify limiting a freedom. But the question 
for courts in such cases is not only how far religious freedom should go 
and where the limit of freedom lies (in terms of undue hardship or 
minimal impairment). It also asks what religious freedom should mean 
conceptually. By “conceptual”, I refer to the definitional qualities of 
religious freedom. What is its character? What value does it promote? 
What does it give and what does it demand? 
Most commentary on freedom of religion looks at jurisprudence in 
the era of statutory human rights and the Charter. I wish to step back 
further, to begin the story of religious freedom at a time of nascent 
doctrine. Given the statutory and formal constitutional lacuna, the early 
Supreme Court jurisprudence developed foundational constitutional 
concepts of religious freedom. This paper revisits three Supreme Court 
religion cases from the 1950s, Saumur, Chaput and Roncarelli.10 In these 
judgments, we see how the Court grounded its protection of religion and 
religious freedom in historical and contextual considerations, philosophi-
cal values, cultural norms and unwritten constitutional principles. The 
Court engaged in conceptual analyses about freedom and the role of 
religion in public life. It decided constitutional rights without reference 
to positive law — only to norms and values. Freedom was understood 
then as a moral and political concept, if not yet a legal right. Injecting its 
assessment of the “good” into its determination of the just, the Court 
articulated a proto-doctrine of constitutional religious freedom. 
In its judgment in L. (S.), the Supreme Court found itself again en-
gaging with conceptual issues related to religious freedom, but within the 
doctrinal framework of section 2(a). In particular, the governing analysis 
of Amselem rested on an assumption of conceptually limitless freedom, 
and used proportionality to rein it in under section 1. In contrast, the 
                                                                                                             
10 Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Saumur”]; Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.J. No. 61, [1955] S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Chaput”]; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Roncarelli”]. 
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conceptual questions in L. (S.) focused the Court on defining freedom, 
using reference to public values. 
L. (S.) dealt with a challenge to the public school curriculum in Que-
bec. The claimants sought an exemption for their children from a 
mandatory “ethics and religious culture” course on the basis that it 
interfered with their parental right to transmit the tenets of the Catholic 
faith to their children. In denying the appellants’ claim, and requiring 
their children to enrol, the Court upheld compulsive diversity and ethical 
pluralism pedagogy as a legitimate mandatory component of public 
school education. In its decision, the Court emphasized the “neutrality” 
of the secular educational program as justification for refusing the 
exemption. However, it did not explain how granting an exemption 
would have undermined the program’s neutrality. There would have been 
little identifiable harm caused by exempting the appellants’ children from 
the course. But public education is, by definition, about instilling public 
values, some of which may not match all of the personal values of all 
recipients of public education. It is well established that some beliefs and 
opinions are not accommodated in the public school classroom.11 
Yet, the Court faced a knotty task in a liberal rights setting, due to 
political liberalism’s persistent discomfort with regulating public values 
and expressive content. Religious freedom under the Charter was still a 
concept in need of a theory. The Court in L. (S.) contributed to a growing 
jurisprudence to this end. However, it rested its reasoning on a flawed 
and fraught premise of “neutrality” in government action. Analyzing 
L. (S.) within the trajectory of recent related jurisprudence, I observe that 
the Supreme Court appears to have embraced a definition of religious 
freedom that has internal conceptual limits which constrain the kinds of 
claims that will be covered by section 2(a). It has, however, only vaguely 
begun to articulate this conception. 
To illustrate the way freedom may be limited within a rights-
definition framework that engages in normative assessments, I draw a 
descriptive distinction between practical and conceptual limits to 
religious freedom. Practical limits are justified by a specific policy or 
legislative objective that necessitates restricting the right in particular 
circumstances, such as courts and tribunals do under section 1 and undue 
hardship analyses. These are freedom claims that are unrealizable, or that 
carry too high a cost on the state or on others. Conceptual limits, mean-
                                                                                                             
11 See, e.g., Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No 40, [1996] 1 
S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.). 
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while, are tied to the definitional bounds of freedom, as defined by 
foundational constitutional, political and social values. Some claims are 
simply beyond the protective reach of the law, even where they are 
subjectively sincere and are grounded in personal morality. 
Canadian constitutional law, being rooted in the liberal-democratic 
political tradition, has inherited a particular, liberal conception of 
freedom as being conceptually limitless. This conception is based on a 
view of freedom that is centred on the individual in society. Neo-
republican political philosopher Philip Pettit argues for a conception of 
democratic freedom that is relational — one that sees human freedom as 
being not only individually held, but as socially contingent and mutually 
reinforcing.12 Because we cannot live without others (in a political 
sense), Pettit suggests that it is unrealistic to shape our understanding of 
liberty in accordance with fantasies of an unencumbered or unbounded 
existence. Rather, freedom exists in a social context and, because it does, 
the courts must carefully define it in any given circumstances in accor-
dance with shared values. Objective review of subjective beliefs, the 
exercise which the Supreme Court has approached with great reluctance,13 
would not only be justifiable, in some cases, it would be inevitable. 
Perhaps some beliefs are undeserving of protection, and others so valuable 
as to warrant mandatory enforcement through public institutions. 
In the final part of this paper, I return to the tension between concep-
tual and practical limits. Political theory serves as an interpretive aid to 
understanding the kinds of limits to freedom being considered. It can 
help articulate reasons for and justifications for public interference, or 
non-interference, with personal choice. I turn to neo-republican democ-
ratic theory to offer an account of what courts do when they choose 
between competing subjectivities — the disharmony of deeply held 
personal experiences and normative views. Rather than imposing limits 
on individual autonomy, republicanism accepts that within democratic 
theory the manifestation of personal beliefs will at times need to yield to 
general norms. 
The break from accommodation analysis in the Supreme Court’s re-
cent judgment in L. (S.) presents an opportune occasion to both critique 
how the Court handled the issues, and to apply a close read of the 
judgment, looking between the lines for a sense of the concept of 
                                                                                                             
12 Philip Pettit, “Law and Liberty” in Samantha Besson & Jose Luis Marti, eds. Law and 
Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [hereinafter “Pettit”]. 
13 Amselem, supra, note 2, at paras. 47-52 (“... nothing short of a religious inquisition would 
be required to decipher the innermost beliefs of human beings”). 
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religious freedom. Legal formalism and liberal concerns about legiti-
macy make it difficult for courts and tribunals to pronounce on normative 
conceptual matters. Nonetheless, a realistic assessment of what decision-
makers do reveals that they are often required to choose between compet-
ing values, and in fact do this already, albeit indirectly and inferentially. 
Better elaboration in reasons for judgment will help strengthen the law’s 
defence of legitimate and egalitarian public policy in the face of greater 
individualized claims. 
II. FREEDOM AS EQUALITY OF RELIGIONS 
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized religious freedom and 
equality as fundamental constitutional rights in a time long before the 
Charter or human rights legislation was enacted. Early Supreme Court 
conceptions of religious rights and freedoms linked religious liberty to 
the equality of religions, the rule of law and fundamental democratic 
principles. Within this description, there is a theory of constitutional 
protection of religious freedom that is both reinforced in, and distinct 
from, later Court articulations of the freedom. The dominant feature to 
which I wish to draw attention is that the protection of religion within 
Canadian constitutional jurisprudence has, from its inception, included a 
dual recognition of both the group and individual bases of religious 
practice and identity. More notably, individual freedoms appear to be 
derived from the acknowledgment and affirmation of religion as a 
legitimate moral and institutional player with status and interests. 
Within constitutional interpretation, the individual’s religious liberty 
was intertwined with the basic equality of all religions (comprising sets 
of individuals, practices, culture, etc.). The foundational principle is the 
equality of religions. The Court declared, in 1955, that: “In this country, 
there is no state religion and all denominations enjoy the same degree of 
freedom of speech and thought.”14 Through non-establishment, we arrived 
at the equality principle.15 Reflecting on the Court’s emphasis on equality 
over liberty, reveals, it seems, the normative world in which the mid-
20th-century bench operated. The principle of religious equality presup-
posed that religion, qua religion, has important collective value and is a 
                                                                                                             
14 Chaput, supra, note 10. 
15 Subject, of course, to the special constitutional protection given to denominational educa-
tion rights that existed at the time of Confederation. See s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
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social good. It was simply a given, in the 1950s, that religion — its 
history, status and privileges — was owed respect and deference, even if 
no “right” existed in any constitutional or statutory instrument. Early 
conceptions of religious freedom saw religious practitioners as, necessar-
ily, members of religious communities. 
In Saumur16 the Court struck down a Quebec by-law that banned the 
public distribution of literature. The claimant was a practising Jehovah’s 
Witness who asserted that the prohibition impeded a fundamental tenet of 
his faith and, as such, amounted to a breach of his freedom of religion. 
Analyzing the claim in the absence of any formal, rights-conferring 
legislation or constitutional provision, Estey J. traced the history of 
religious liberty in Canada. He located the first expressions of Canadian 
religious freedom in the 1760 Treaty of Paris on the occasion of the 
British acquisition of French colonies, whereby Great Britain agreed “to 
grant the liberty of the Catholick religion to the inhabitants of Canada”.17 
The wording of this is noteworthy; it speaks to the liberation of religion, 
not to people. Justice Rand concurred, ruling: “[T]hat the untrammelled 
affirmations of religious belief and its propagation, personal or institu-
tional, remain as of the greatest constitutional significance throughout 
the Dominion is unquestionable.”18 Relying formally on a division of 
powers analysis for the remedy, the majority judgments were a re-
sounding embrace of religious freedom as a “principle of fundamental 
character”.19 
Two years later, in Chaput,20 the Supreme Court confirmed the Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses’ freedom to assemble, again affirming the fundamental 
equality of religions. The police had raided the home of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses engaged in worship, seizing Bibles and other religious 
material. No warrant had been obtained and no charges were laid. In 
making a civil finding and an award of damages against the police, the 
Court summarized the facts: “The appellant suffered an invasion of his 
home and his right of freedom of worship was publicly and peremptorily 
interfered with.”21 The Court used the opportunity to confirm that: “In 
                                                                                                             
16 Supra, note 10. The Court was deeply divided, splitting 5-4. The five majority judges 
each wrote separate judgments, and there were two pairs of dissenters, each with reasons. 
17 Id., at 357. 
18 Id., at 327 (emphasis added). 
19 Id. 
20 Supra, note 10. 
21 Id., at 859. 
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this country, there is no state religion and all denominations enjoy the 
same degree of freedom of speech and thought.”22 
Similarly, in the well-known Roncarelli case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada found that the Premier of Quebec had acted with an improper 
intent and in contravention of the rule of law when he interfered with the 
appellant’s liquor licence application. The Court ruled that, in revoking 
the appellant’s liquor licence, the Premier used his elected power “as a 
means of bringing to halt the activities of the [Jehovah’s] Witnesses to 
punish the appellant for the part he had played”.23 In his judgment, Rand 
J. described the appellant’s practice of religion as an “unchallengeable 
right”.24 
Thus, early religious freedom doctrine laid the groundwork for a ba-
sic protection from state coercion. Minority religions could rest assured 
that the Constitution would defend against state interference in matters of 
conscience. In the 1950s, the Court did not directly apply a constitutional 
freedom to worship to produce a remedy, but rather used religious 
freedom as a value that informed its application of other legal rules. The 
principle of equality of religions held that the state must ensure sufficient 
room for religion to flourish. The role of law was to be neutral, so as not 
to favour any one religion over another. State neutrality, then, was 
synonymous with equality between religions, and presupposed a general 
respect and protection of all faith groups.25 Thus, Jehovah’s Witnesses, a 
historically distrusted minority26 that was openly hostile to Protestants, 
Catholics and Jews alike,27 came to be victors in the formative religious 
freedom jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                             
22 Id., at 835 (per Kerwin C.J.C., Taschereau and Estey JJ.). 
23 Roncarelli, supra, note 10, at 133. 
24 Id., at 143. 
25 “Neutrality” was also conditioned on the supremacy of God, a doctrine that is paired with 
the rule of law in the preamble to the Charter. God’s supremacy remains an open question under 
constitutional jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was, quite notably, silent on the question of God’s 
supremacy in the 1998 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
(S.C.C.), a judgment which described the foundational constitutional norms. In its discussion of 
democracy and constitutionalism, the Court emphasized the supremacy of the Constitution — but 
even this is seen as a transition from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional supremacy. God is 
simply absent. In R. v. Sharpe, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1555, 1999 BCCA 416, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at 
paras. 79 and 80 (B.C.C.A.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal, with Nietzschean flare, 
pronounced the Preamble a “dead letter”, though it left it open to the Supreme Court to resurrect 
God’s supremacy. 
26 See Gary Botting, Fundamental Freedoms and Jehovah’s Witnesses (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Press, 1993). 
27 In a dissenting judgment in Saumur, supra, note 10, at 117, penned by Rinfret C.J.C. 
(Taschereau J. concurring), the Court reviewed evidence from the record in which a representative of 
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III. FREEDOM AS INDIVIDUAL ACCOMMODATION 
Religious freedoms lie, historically, in the experience of religious 
minorities needing protection from the enforcement of majority religious 
norms through state institutionalization. While the Canadian Constitu-
tion, unlike its U.S. counterpart, does not require a religiously neutral 
state, there is no state-established religion in Canada and early religious 
freedom doctrine established the principles of basic protection from 
coercion, upon which subsequent approaches to religious freedom would 
be based. 
The 1960s saw significant changes in the law. The adoption of statu-
tory human rights instruments, and the first Canadian Bill of Rights, was 
the local manifestation of enthusiasm for universal human rights glob-
ally, and for the civil rights movement in the United States. Writing in 
a special human rights edition of the Canadian Bar Review in 1968, 
J.G. Castel addressed the status of provincial human rights codes and 
the Canadian Bill of Rights,28 concluding that Canada’s laws relating to 
the protection of rights and freedoms were, at the time, insufficiently 
strong: 
It is a pity that these statutes are often narrow and quite ineffectual. 
Furthermore, Canadian courts have tended to emasculate the federal 
Bill of Rights and to consider civil liberties as a constitutional division 
of powers issue only. There has been a strong judicial tendency to 
assume that Parliament did not intend by the Bill of Rights to alter 
specific pre-existing inconsistent federal statutory provisions.29 
The sea change in Canadian law came in the 1970s with the embrace 
of the “duty to accommodate”, lifted from American civil rights jurispru-
                                                                                                             
the Jehovah’s Witnesses testified as to his religious beliefs. The questions (“Q.”) and answers (“A.”) 
proceed as follows: 
Q. Do you consider necessary for your organization to attack the other religions, in fact, 
the Catholic, the Protestant and the Jews? — A. Indeed. The reason for that is because the 
Almighty God commands that error shall be exposed and not persons or nations. 
Q. You are the only witnesses of the truth? — A. Jehovah’s Witnesses are the only wit-
nesses to the truth of Almighty God Jehovah ... Q. Is the Roman Catholic a true church? 
— A. No. 
Q. Is it an unclean woman? — A. It is pictured in the Bible as a whore, as having illicit 
relationship with the nations of this world, and history proves that fact, history that all 
have studied in school. 
28 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
29 J.G. Castel, “International Year for Human Rights 1968” (1968) 46 Can. Bar Rev. 545, at 
545-46. 
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dence.30 The doctrine was developed as an anti-discrimination protection 
for religious minorities against the disparate impact caused by neutral 
rules, mostly in the workplace. Labour arbitrators and statutory human 
rights boards were the first to apply it.31 With the adoption of the Charter 
in 1982, accommodation analysis came to be the defining doctrinal 
framework for adjudicating freedom of religion claims.32 The anti-
discrimination function of accommodation analysis in the religious 
context was bolstered by the inclusion of section 15 equality in the 
Charter, and by the increasing harmonization of Charter analysis and 
statutory anti-discrimination law, in particular with respect to limiting 
exercises under section 1 and undue hardship, respectively.33 
Religious accommodation attained unprecedented heights in the 
workplace when, in 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that near-
sacred seniority rules in a unionized workplace would have to yield to an 
individual worker’s religious needs.34 This necessitated a redistribution 
of something tangible — choice of hours of work. There are only so 
many Saturdays off to go around the workplace. The Saturday Sabbath 
observer was entitled to jump the queue because his interest in not 
working on Saturday was prioritized over the interests of others because 
of religion. This showed how the duty to accommodate could generate an 
entitlement to something, not just to a guarantee of non-interference. The 
freedom necessarily required “special” treatment in public services and 
                                                                                                             
30 See Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O’Malley”], citing Reid v. Memphis 
Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972) and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 
1972). According to the Supreme Court of Canada, “Statutory authority for this approach in the 
United States is said to be found in the provisions of the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 — see: Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USCS § 2000e(j); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).” 
31 See, e.g., Canada Valve Ltd. v. International Molders & Allied Workers’ Union, Local 
279 (1975), 9 L.A.C. (2d) 414, at paras. 30-31 (an employer has a duty to balance the worker’s 
religious interests with the company’s commercial interests. Refusing to grant leave to observe a 
religious holiday must be supported with valid reasons and objective review of relevant workplace 
needs). See also Ishar Singh v. Security Investigation Services Protection Co. (May 31, 1977, 
unreported decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario), at 16-17 (adverse religious effects 
arising from a neutral workplace rule need not be intentional to be discriminatory; to be found 
reasonable, the employer must demonstrate that the rule was adopted in good faith and is reasonably 
necessary to the employer’s business interests). 
32 O’Malley, supra, note 30. 
33 Janet Epp Buckingham, “Drivers Needed: Tough Choices from Alberta v. Wilson Colony 
of Hutterian Brethren” (2009-2010) 18 Const. F. 109, at 113. See also Lorne Sossin, “God at Work: 
Religion in the Workplace and the Limits of Pluralism in Canada” (2008-2009) 30 Comp. Lab. L. & 
Pol’y J. 485, at 491. 
34 Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] S.C.J. No. 75, [1992] 2 
S.C.R. 970 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Renaud”]. 
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the workplace, and called for policing state action so as to protect 
religious minorities from the “tyranny of the [religious] majority”.35 In 
this vein, the Court in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. described section 2(a) 
as protecting “both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right 
to manifest beliefs and practices”.36 
With accommodation woven into its constitutional fabric, religious 
freedom was girded with a sword: the right to manifest beliefs. Some-
times manifestation required “special” arrangements: time, effort, material, 
resources, etc. The “something” to which accommodation created an 
entitlement would almost always be scarce. For that reason, the exercise 
of identifying appropriate accommodation would need to be context-
specific, depending on what is needed in the circumstances to offset the 
adverse consequences of a neutral rule. The right is strong: it goes as far 
as necessary. The limit is undue hardship: not all that is necessary is just 
or fair in the overall circumstances. Hardship is measured by the impact 
that altering a neutral rule will have on individuals.37 Big M described 
limits broadly to include, in addition to health and safety, “order”, 
“morals” and “the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”.38 
Armed with the sword of accommodation, claims raised in Canadian 
courts and statutory human rights tribunals these days increasingly 
push the limits of doctrinal interpretation.39 Courts and tribunals are 
asked to interpret fundamental conceptual questions within the constraints 
of statutory and constitutional language. Such cases have challenged 
assumptions and values that underlie many of society’s established 
norms and traditions. Beyond being a “defence” against adverse-effects 
discrimination, accommodation can be deployed in ways that directly 
target systemic discrimination and seek to transform the way society and 
the public realm are themselves constructed. 
                                                                                                             
35 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
36 Id., at para. 95. 
37 Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship”, in Richard 
Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), at 1, 2. 
38 Big M, supra, note 35, at para. 95. 
39 See R. v. S. (N.), [2010] O.J. No. 4306, 2010 ONCA 670 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“S. (N.)”] (a witness/complainant in criminal trial was seeking a right to testify while wearing a 
niqab, on the basis that covering her face in public is a religious commitment); and Whatcott v. 
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Tribunal), [2010] S.J. No. 108, 2010 SKCA 26 (Sask. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Whatcott”] (whether freedom of religion and expression protects the distribution of 
literature that contains crude, harsh and demeaning comments about potential sexual practices of 
homosexuals). Both cases were heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in late 2011 and, at the time 
of writing, are pending judgment. 
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As Canadian society has diversified and minority aspirations blos-
som, the pressure on accommodation will continue to grow. Many 
current religious freedom claims are closely tied to culture, community 
and identity. They reflect individual struggles to realize the self in a 
world of difference. While state-imposed religion has been virtually 
banished from public space, members of minority religions are able to 
employ accommodation to gain greater claims to it, even redefining it.40 
Religious accommodation today is, therefore, as much about cultural 
integration and social cohesion as it is about individual rights. 
The pervasiveness of accommodation analysis in deciding issues of 
religion and public life risks reifying the right and forcing the remedy. 
By this I mean to suggest that, while a strong approach is sometimes 
necessary to give meaning to the right being protected, excessive focus 
on the means rather than the goal can exclude consideration of other 
relevant factors of a social or interpersonal nature. The liberal construc-
tion of religion in the courts41 has fit squarely within the individualist 
accommodation approach. Indeed, accommodation is the Charter’s best 
mechanism to advance claims based primarily on individual, as opposed 
to collective, interests.42 Claims of this sort have been the hallmark of the 
protective reach of section 2(a); claims based on group or community 
rights, on the other hand, have been generally unsuccessful.43 
The Court’s analysis in Amselem and Multani create the risk of po-
tentially limitless individual claims of religious accommodation. Under 
the approach articulated in Amselem, those who owe the duty to accom-
modate — employers, school boards, condominium boards, those offering 
goods and services, all branches of government and public offices — are 
subject to the sincerely held beliefs of others, regardless of how different 
they might be. The only limit to this duty is harm, which has operated 
only as a practical limit on unrestrained freedom. This has led observers 
to note that “establishing a prima facie infringement of section 2(a) is 
straightforward (because the right is defined broadly and from an almost 
                                                                                                             
40 Consider the case of the middle-school cafeteria converted into a Friday prayer hall to 
meet the needs of many of the school’s overwhelmingly Muslim population. See Louise Brown, 
“Friday prayers return at Valley Park” The Toronto Star (November 21, 2011). 
41 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra, note 8, at 281. 
42 Faisal Bhabha, “Between Exclusion and Assimilation: Experimentalizing Multicultural-
ism” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 45, at 53. 
43 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra, note 8, at 289-90. 
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completely subjective viewpoint); and there is more scrutiny of state 
justification [under section 1]”.44 
It certainly appeared in decisions over the past decade that the Su-
preme Court of Canada was developing a jurisprudence of section 2(a) 
that recognizes a broad conception of religious freedom, and indeed one 
that has tended to promote a more robust approach to equality than under 
section 15 during the same period.45 Berger has argued that the “great 
difficulty of the constitutional protection of religion is emphatically not 
found in navigating the internal requirements of section 2(a)” but rather 
in the “sheer scope of possible conflict between religion and government 
objectives”.46 Thus, it is at section 1 that the Court has used proportional-
ity analysis to balance the government’s need to regulate for a diverse 
society with the inevitable claims of those who are adversely affected. In 
Hutterian Brethren, McLachlin C.J.C., while acknowledging that section 
2(a) creates a broad right indeed, noted that giving effect to every 
religious claim could undermine the universality of many government 
programs.47 
Of course, the effect of accommodation analysis is always to interro-
gate, if not undermine, the universality of regulatory programs, to the 
limited extent to which they negatively impact on people’s religious 
beliefs or practices. Accommodation looks closely at the practical 
implications of unrestrained freedom and the ways that established 
norms can be stretched. But it fails to offer the tools for closely examin-
ing the content of the freedom claim and whether the rule ought to be 
accommodating in the first place. It is this distinction to which I now 
turn, with a view to developing a theoretical understanding of rights 
definition that both acknowledges the normative content of religious 
freedom claims, and legitimizes adjudicative wading into normativity. 
IV. THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM 
No single understanding of freedom can be taken as a given. Any 
legal doctrine, rule or definition will be informed by ideas about politics 
                                                                                                             
44 Carissima Mathen, “What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence Reveals about Equality” 
(2009) 6:2 J.L. & Equality 163, at 163. 
45 Id. 
46 Benjamin L. Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Difference: 
Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” in J. Cameron & 
B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 25, at 26-27 [hereinafter “Berger, ‘Assessing the Impacts’”]. 
47 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 7, at para. 36. 
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and social life.48 Canada’s judges not only operate within a constitutional 
framework of parliamentary democracy, but they also understand the 
concepts and institutions of democracy from the perspective of political 
liberalism. In the discussion that follows, I describe the limits of conven-
tional liberalism to understanding the role of the courts in defining rights 
and freedoms. Because of its discomfort with adjudicating normative 
substance, and its sensitivity to state action (coupled with a preference 
for state inaction), liberalism fails to accurately account for the ways in 
which the state enforces norms and values through law and regulation. 
Beginning with the communitarian critique of liberalism, I move on to 
draw from the republican democratic tradition a theoretical framework 
that, I suggest, illuminates what courts have been doing in religious 
freedom jurisprudence. I also suggest that this framework may be of 
some relevance as courts and decision-makers will find themselves 
increasingly having to engage meaningfully with social norms and public 
interests, and to make normative assessments about the content of 
religious beliefs. 
According to political philosopher Michael Sandel, it is useful to 
think about two types of limits inherent in our understanding of justice 
within a liberal rights paradigm: practical and conceptual.49 Practical 
limits refer to problems of application — the kinds of paradoxes that he 
says liberalism produces: abutting and conflicting rights requiring 
constraints and rationalizations. Such analysis is what leads to the kind of 
balancing the courts engage in when applying proportionality assess-
ments, such as under section 1 of the Charter or the undue hardship 
defence. At the core of liberalism’s freedom paradox is the concept of 
“personhood”, and what it means to be a free person. Liberalism, 
according to Sandel, is tied to a view of the “person” that inevitably 
reproduces a paradox of conceptually limitless, but practically con-
strained, freedom. Liberal rights, informed by the political philosophy of 
John Rawls, are typically conceptualized with a view of “personhood” in 
an abstract, idealized, “pure” form — what Rawls dubs the “original 
position”, where freedom is unconstrained.50 
                                                                                                             
48 By “politics”, I refer to social relationships and structures of authority in which power is 
distributed and exercised. 
49 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1982). 
50 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1971). 
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Sandel argues that the Rawlsian conception of the “person” is 
flawed, precisely because it is unrealistic. He describes Rawls’ original 
position as an abstraction, an idealized “unencumbered self”, that is not a 
helpful conceptual starting point for thinking about questions of justice. 
For Rawls, it is essential to strip away certain personal and social 
knowledge — to step behind the “veil of ignorance” — in order to 
determine fair principles of justice. Thus, one of the “essential features of 
this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position 
or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like”.51 
This position of absolute neutrality — of perfect, if not imaginary, 
equality — may be philosophically useful, in the abstract, for articulating 
a universal conception of the good. But it can also be seen as counter-
productive because it strips the “person” of many of the characteristics 
that give life worth and meaning. Can questions of justice really be 
separated from questions of interests? Can the “person” conceptually be 
separated from communal attachments? For Sandel, the “person” is 
already encumbered in numerous ways — by family ties, associational 
ties, religious ties, etc. These ties are so integral to the self that they can 
only be set aside at great personal cost, if at all.52 
Because Rawls’ idea of the pre-encumbered self is an abstract ideal, 
any notion of freedom constructed from that starting position risks 
creating norms out of fallacies.53 Fine-tuning the liberal conception of 
freedom is necessary because, as Sandel notes, the relationship between 
freedom and justice will be distinct depending on whether the political 
theory on which they are respectively constructed begins from a concep-
tion of an atomized, individualistic society, or one that is inherently 
interconnected and interdependent. The form and content of doctrines of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation invariably will be shaped by 
the underlying conceptions of freedom and justice that define the 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional protections. Greater clarity from 
courts and tribunals about the underlying values shaping the freedoms 
they are defining and interpreting in the context of specific case facts 
                                                                                                             
51 Id., at 12-13. 
52 This analysis has been adopted in the Supreme Court’s approach to “immutable” charac-
teristics and grounds under s. 15 equality of the Charter. See Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian 
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Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) [hereinafter “Taylor”]; Amitai Etzioni, 
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would offer greater assistance to understanding the potential breadth and 
scope of these protections. 
Distinguishing between types of limits to freedom is both descriptive 
and normative. The values that define the starting position of the individ-
ual in society will largely determine the form and scope of legal rights. 
For example, a society built on a conception of justice that prioritizes 
boundless individual liberty is likely to do less about pursuing a shared 
conception of the good. A theory that is uncomfortable with creating out 
of rights “positive” obligations for the state is also likely reluctant to 
impose heavy obligations on citizens. Conversely, a regime which 
conceives of rights and freedoms as relational may have less difficulty 
nurturing expectations of the state to provide and redistribute, while 
also enforcing a concomitant principle of obligation and belonging on 
citizens.54 
The work of Philip Pettit encapsulates the republican,55 or what Pettit 
calls a “pre-liberal”, theory of liberty.56 Underlying this understanding is 
the idea that freedom is always constrained in any social or political 
context. The inherent constraints of liberty stem from the founding 
arrangement of political organization: individual restrictions promote 
liberty as a whole. For Pettit, law is the means by which citizens control 
themselves so as to enable their freedom. Rather than creating a paradox, 
if we accept that there is a fixed amount of the material or substance of 
freedom (that is, in a tangible sense), the freedom of any individual is 
inherently limited by the reality of scarcity. Pettit distinguishes the 
republican view from that of classical liberalism as follows: 
Rousseau said that man is born free and is everywhere in chains — 
everywhere bound in the chains of law. The truth is that not only are 
people everywhere in chains, they are everywhere born in chains; there 
is no such thing as a State-less, uncoerced existence. Call this the fact 
of territorial scarcity.57 
The republican tradition of freedom, then, is premised not on a nor-
mative view of how the individual ought to exist in the world, but rather 
on a conception of how human life actually is. Pettit echoes Sandel’s 
claim that we are all born with encumbrances; but they need not be 
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56 Pettit, supra, note 12. 
57 Id., at 52. 
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viewed as “chains”. The limits inherent in being human also enable us to 
be free. They provide protections and permissions that open possibilities 
for a rich life, represented in freedoms of conscience, expression and 
association. Thus, for Pettit, not all interference reduces freedom — only 
such interference that interferes arbitrarily with one’s ability to believe, 
express and associate. 
If law is the way that people control themselves, then when the 
legitimate, positivist system of law legitimately interferes with one’s 
natural choices, it can be viewed as a form of collective self-control. For 
example, the fact that a person is prohibited by law from killing another 
is a form of constraint that may interfere with one’s natural choice or 
preference in any given circumstances. But the social good of having 
such laws is easily justifiable on universal principles. At the same time, 
there is sufficient flexibility in the law to recognize exceptions and 
mitigating factors that will, at times, permit a person the freedom to kill: 
consider the doctrines of necessity or self-defence. Freedom, conceived 
this way, then, is relational, contextual and rational. 
But there are important conditions that the law must meet in order to 
be considered legitimate and, thereby, freedom-enhancing.58 As long as 
the laws are controlled by the people subject to them, there can be no 
injury to freedom, even as the law itself regulates zones of individuals’ 
overlapping choices. Overlap refers to domains where others can be 
simultaneously free to exercise choice. The important thing, for Pettit, is 
non-domination; in other words, that equality in the protection of choice 
is assured. It is through the principle of equality that restrictions on 
choice may be justified under this theory of democratic legitimacy. As 
long as everybody is equally deprived, there can be no loss of freedom. 
The republican conception of freedom reflects a communitarian 
ethic, one in which every individual’s interests are bounded up in the 
interests of others. This is not based on a normative view about the 
way people ought to live together in society (though it may be). More 
important is its acceptance that human interdependency is a given — a 
fact, as it were. This idea rests on the concept that the realization of 
freedom does not lie solely in the removal of encumbrances on the 
individual, but more importantly on constructing legal norms that promote 
freedom-enhancing social equality.59 Not only is the Rawlsian liberal 
                                                                                                             
58 Id., at 53-55. 
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idea of an unencumbered self unrealistic, as Sandel notes, but it is also 
undesirable and even anti-social: the freest individuals would be those 
who demonstrate no need (or desire) for social connection or community 
at all. 
To be free in the republican sense implies being supported and 
protected in the world — connected to others and interdependent.60 
Freedom and equality in this paradigm are mutually reinforcing. For 
many liberals, in contrast, equality creates a rights paradox61 because it 
requires restraining or depriving the strong in order to support and 
advance the weak. If constitutional rights and freedoms are conceived of 
as a vehicle to promoting the unencumbered self, then taken to its 
extreme, this sort of hyper-individualism will view virtually all forms of 
social or political organization, and the collective responsibility that 
comes with it, as anathema to freedom. This is how liberalism morphs 
into libertarianism.62 
Theoretical questions about conceptions of freedom are very much of 
practical relevance. Theories and concepts underlie legal rules and 
doctrines and always inform judicial reasoning, even if judges do not 
always articulate their theoretical assumptions. Many of the difficult 
questions facing policy-makers and judges concerning claims of religious 
freedom in the contemporary Canadian political order will be shaped by 
what meaning is given to the constitutional protection of freedom. For 
example, when the Court decided to permit compelled secular instruction 
about religion, it decided that religious freedom does not include a 
parental right to pick and choose from the curriculum.63 A different 
conception of freedom might have concluded the opposite. Similarly, the 
Court in S. (N.) is expected to resolve whether a woman who wears a 
religious veil should be compelled to show her face in court in order to 
testify in a criminal proceeding.64 One conception of freedom may view 
the veil as excessively anti-social or contrary to Charter values, and 
therefore unworthy of protection.65 Another conception of freedom may 
                                                                                                             
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
62 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) (articu-
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63 L. (S.), supra, note 9 (see discussion below). 
64 Supra, note 39. 
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lic Space (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) (explaining, from an anthropological, 
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view the rule of testifying with an exposed face as excessively harsh and 
arbitrary when enforced against a woman who believes that covering her 
face in public is a religious duty. 
These challenging fact scenarios are not necessarily, or exclusively, 
about competing rights. They are often about conflicting values. They 
provide the backdrop for the practical application of human rights provi-
sions to “hard cases”, involving contested claims to religious freedom in 
a complex societal setting with competing interests. Such cases often 
strike to the core, simultaneously, of what it means for a person to be 
free, and for a society to be just. In the next part, I return to L. (S.) to 
explore these themes, and analyze the decision with a view to identifying 
a theory of conceptual limitation that moves beyond accommodation and 
constructions of competing rights. 
V. CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL LIMITS  
TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The Supreme Court’s recent religious freedom jurisprudence reveals 
a tension between two types of limits: conceptual and practical. Section 
1, which provides for limits of constitutional rights where they are 
“reasonable” and “demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic 
society”, establishes the definitive test for practical limits on religious 
freedoms. The government bears the onus of defending a policy or 
measure which has a limiting effect on a bona fide religious practice. The 
courts assess whether the restriction is minimally impairing and/or 
whether the salutary benefits of the government restriction outweigh the 
deleterious effects.66 A similar approach is used in the accommodation 
analysis most often applicable to statutory religious rights claims.67 
What is less developed is the Court’s articulation of a theory of con-
ceptual limitation. Amselem established a conceptual framework for 
section 2(a) of virtually limitless freedom. To find a Charter breach, the 
Court would only need to be persuaded that subjective sincerity was 
established, and a harm identified.68 The “subjective sincerity” test could 
be interpreted to mean that the Charter deems worthy of protection 
boundless freedom, as long as it is based on a subjectively sincere 
                                                                                                             
66 See Berger, “Assessing the Impacts”, supra, note 46, for a good treatment of the Supreme 
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religious belief. The reluctance of the Court to involve itself in substan-
tive review of religious doctrine, removing any objective consideration 
of the content of expression,69 has led to a conception of section 2(a) that 
is “so capacious as to be largely analytically vacant”.70 
Since Amselem, the Supreme Court has been retreating from its con-
struction of religious freedom, attaching caveats at various opportunities. 
In Bruker, for instance, Abella J. stated that: “Not all differences are 
compatible with Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all 
barriers to their expression are arbitrary.”71 The Court described the 
fundamental values at stake in that case, but it remains unclear whether 
an exhaustive list of fundamental values exists, and what its contents are. 
Identifying values that underlie constitutional law and deciding how they 
shape public law’s treatment of religion is not a simple matter of judicial 
interpretation. It involves choices and decisions about the values that 
should shape our freedoms. As much as the Court wishes to evade 
adjudicating moral questions, it is inescapable. 
It is essential to confront the fact that neutrality in rights adjudication 
is impossible in contemporary Canadian society. If the constitutional 
commitment to multiculturalism means anything, people’s beliefs ought 
to be taken seriously on their own terms. The difficult task is adjudicating 
between competing normative outlooks. Courts and tribunals are increas-
ingly called upon to make value judgments about matters of conscience 
that often stem from moral worldviews that are foreign to the decision-
maker. Many of the contemporary claims involve marks of identity — 
the attire, symbols and deeply personal behaviours of the claimant — and 
sit at the intersection of individual autonomy and group belonging. 
The Charter can protect an individual’s interests as a member of a 
group in Canadian society, but not as an individual within that group. 
Religious organizations are not subject to the Charter and are statutorily 
shielded from human rights legislation. As a result, members of minority 
or religious communities can use the law to remove barriers and claim 
greater autonomy and space only in relation to those outside their group. 
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While a woman can claim a constitutional right to testify in court in a 
niqab, she cannot assert a constitutional right to assume the minbar 
(pulpit) in her mosque. There is no legal obligation on religious commu-
nities to create Charter-compliant conditions within their institutions, 
families and social practices. 
Thus, while contentious cases, such as prayer in school cafeterias, 
niqabs in court, scrolls in cabs,72 etc. are framed, at law, as claims by an 
affected individual against the “neutral” public, what is often at play is a 
deep disagreement about how a diverse society is, and should be, 
structured. Accommodation analysis frames such cases as mostly 
involving private interests of conscience and identity. Yet, the public 
interests are present and often captivate media attention. This was 
apparent in the highly publicized Ontario case involving Muslim prayers 
in the cafeteria of Valley Park Middle School in Toronto’s Thorncliffe 
neighbourhood. 
The school had a Muslim student population of more than 800, about 
one-half of whom attended weekly prayers.73 Before prayers were 
offered in the school cafeteria, students had been travelling to neighbour-
hood mosques each week and many were missing Friday afternoon 
classes.74 A straightforward accommodation analysis led to the practical 
solution that, instead of having hundreds of students leave school in the 
middle of the day, it would be more efficient to provide space for the 
event to occur at the school. The duty to accommodate would not 
necessarily obligate the school to provide anything more than space and 
time. Indeed, this is precisely the arrangement that had been in place for 
three years.75 It only became an issue of national interest in 2011 after 
activists led by a group called Canadian Hindu Advocacy sought to 
expose the issue to public scrutiny.76 
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There was little dispute that the arrangement was, strictly speaking, 
legal.77 Indeed, under a strict application of the Amselem test for religious 
accommodation, subject to any practical limits — cost, safety, etc. — 
there appeared to be no sound reason to deny the accommodation, 
assuming the students could demonstrate a sincere belief that attending 
weekly congregational prayers at the stipulated time is a religious 
obligation. For some, the fact that Muslims were holding mass prayer 
sessions in the public school cafeteria was wrong for other reasons. To 
critics, there was nothing neutral about accommodation in this instance: 
it gave public endorsement to a particular religion. This raised both a 
moral problem78 and a political problem.79 According to one unhappy 
commentator: 
The school may be following a policy of accommodating special 
requests, but there’s a striking difference between designating a room 
for a handful of students and converting the largest room in the 
building for group prayer. The school becomes, in effect, a mosque.80 
Indeed, when you have a school full of Muslims who overwhelm-
ingly believe in weekly congregational prayer that happens to occur 
during school hours, the practical solution is to transform part of the 
school into a space for worship. The “problem”, it seems, stems from the 
social fact of people of particular religious backgrounds becoming 
concentrated in particular neighbourhoods. Where there are many 
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Muslims who share a high level of religious observance, the public space 
will be transformed. This is the practical implication of the constitutional 
commitment to multiculturalism. Much of what makes contemporary 
religious freedom cases so challenging is that diversity compels a re-
examination of basic concepts. Making adjudication even harder is the 
need to analyze concepts through intersectional lenses, given that many 
contemporary religious freedom claims occur in a racialized and gen-
dered context. All of this means that the social environment in which 
many accommodation claims arise involve constructions of “the other” 
and problems of objectification. At the same time, the legal process 
necessarily co-opts; it demands that subjective experiences and perspec-
tives be objectively verifiable. So, we are always looking at others 
through our own subjective lens. 
L. (S.) was not a case that involved minority integration or the un-
known “other”, but rather touched on Quebec’s particular history with 
the Catholic Church. Aggressive secularization beginning in the 1960s 
led to a purging of religion from public education, and the dismantling of 
denominational schools. The appellants in L. (S.) were devout Roman 
Catholics who asserted a right to withdraw their children from a manda-
tory middle school class about “religious culture and ethics”. Because the 
impugned course provided “neutral” (i.e., secular) instruction about 
various religions and philosophical traditions, the appellants argued that 
their right as parents to fulfil their religious duty to transmit their faith 
was obstructed. 
The Court was unanimous in refusing to accept that the appellants 
had established in fact any interference with the fulfilment of their 
sincere belief. For LeBel J. (with Fish J. concurring), there was not only 
insufficient evidence about the effects of the program, but there was also 
insufficient evidence about the program’s content and goals.81 There 
could be no evidence that the program actually prevented the appellants 
from transmitting their faith to their children. The children had never 
been enrolled in the course — it was not even offered yet — and the 
parents’ anticipation of interference could not ground an objective 
finding of religious encroachment. Essentially, the Court found that the 
                                                                                                             
81 L. (S.), supra, note 9, at paras. 55-56: 
Even after a careful reading, it is not really possible to assess what the program’s imple-
mentation will actually mean. As a result, it is hard to tell what the emphasis [sic] the 
program will place on Quebec’s religious heritage and on [sic] the cultural and historical 
importance of Catholicism and Protestantism in that province will mean. 
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appellants were conflating the subjective and objective parts of the 
Amselem test. 
While the reasoning appears to make sense — how can a claimant’s 
subjective belief alone predict an objective finding of fact? — it obscures 
the more fundamental question of whether the school board had a duty to 
accommodate the parents’ wishes. The claimants were asking the Court 
to find a constitutional obligation on the public education system (which 
sets curriculum based on normative goals and public interests) to allow 
individuals to select items on the educational menu, and to reject others, 
in accordance with purely subjective religious views. The Court did not 
find the duty to accommodate was engaged because the religious 
obstruction was unproved. 
But the question remains: Imagine if the appellants had articulated 
their claim as a sincerely held belief that mere exposure to other religions 
is contrary to their beliefs. The objective question of harm is irrelevant to 
the subjective question of belief. If this is what they believed, would the 
Court demand objective evidence to support the subjective belief as fact? 
It is evident that answering this question, without noting a fundamental 
flaw in the Amselem test, would be untenable. Instead, the Court ducked 
dealing with the appellants’ beliefs as beliefs, and treated them as 
“unproven facts” (fallacies? myths?). 
A fair treatment of the appellants’ belief would have acknowledged 
that their belief consisted of both a “factual” (and therefore objective) 
problem, but also a problem of conscience (and therefore subjective). 
Belief that one’s faith is threatened is itself evidence of the threat. 
Conscience must, by definition, include dominion over all matters of 
personal, cognitive space, including the content of one’s thoughts and 
convictions. This is, it seems, the logic by which the Constitution 
protects people’s belief in God even though God’s existence cannot be 
proven in court. 
There are other ways of imagining the L. (S.) appellants’ claims plau-
sibly, at least to the extent of being able to establish, on objective 
evidence, a limit on their Charter rights. The challenge is not interpretive 
but rather textual. Suppose the appellants had asserted a claim to the 
effect that secular instruction about morality is itself a sin. What if my 
religion tells me that I am only permitted to learn about morals and 
ethics from a religious teacher or from my parents? There could be no 
doubt that the education program at issue in the case would adversely 
affect adherence to this religious rule. When the state encroaches on a 
tenet of faith, the law does not typically look at the tenet, but rather at the 
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encroachment. However, with the widening scope of diversity, and the 
infinite possibilities in the kinds of claims that could come before courts 
and tribunals for protection of religious beliefs and practices, the law is 
going to find itself speaking to elemental conceptual questions about 
freedom and equality more regularly. 
Imagine the challenge of a religious adherent who asserts a tenet of 
exclusive conviction — that is, the view that only one’s own worldview 
is legitimate and worthy of contemplation. A similarly strong accommo-
dation claim could be made by those of a more atheistic or anti-deistic 
persuasion. Consider a parent seeking an exemption from any legitima-
tion of religion, arguing that true neutrality requires a complete absence 
of religion in educational institutions. This claim might argue that any 
“neutral” (i.e., non-evaluative) instruction about religion creates a veneer 
of legitimacy, privileging these worldviews over others, and breaching 
the freedom of conscience of non-believers. In either of these examples, 
the claim would, following Amselem, be based on a subjective, sincere 
belief. For the religious isolationists, the belief would be that their 
religion forbids early childhood education about other religions, and any 
form of secular education about religion generally. For the atheists, the 
claim would be that their conscience forbids them from exposing their 
children to instruction about any religion unless the purpose is to 
discredit it. 
By reconstructing the L. (S.) claim in these various ways, we can 
peel beneath the analysis employed by the Court to reveal unresolved 
tensions in the analytical approach applied to section 2(a). It is becoming 
apparent that the Court would not accept all beliefs as equally protected 
under section 2(a). The hierarchy of beliefs would see only those 
practices that are acceptable or tolerable to certain core values earning 
Charter protection. Those that offend a core Canadian value, like gender 
equality or multiculturalism, will fail to earn strong protection. This does 
not mean that the courts are going to police the beliefs and practices of 
the nation, nor does it mean that the state apparatus has carte blanche to 
persecute such practitioners.82 But the Charter will only embrace those 
beliefs that pass a threshold values test. How that test looks, and how it 
will be explained and rationalized, are mostly unknown. We can surmise 
that the enforcement of such values in the form of a legal test must be 
non-arbitrary, and that its content must be “neutral”. 
                                                                                                             
82 Of course, concerns about stereotyping, scapegoating and any other discriminatory con-
sequences should be taken seriously. 
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VI. NEUTRALITY IS DEAD: LONG LIVE NEUTRALITY 
As Berger notes, court interpretations of religion tend to reinforce 
through “objective” analysis a particular liberal perspective which is 
never neutral.83 It is best described as agnostic. Courts are neither 
enforcing majoritarian religious norms on minorities, nor acting upon 
anti-religious animus. Rather, neutrality has come to represent an official 
doctrine of agnosticism, which formally holds no opinion, but in practi-
cal terms contemporaneously holds possibility and doubt with respect 
to the divine. Its effects can be both protective and harmful. The only 
thing about which neutrality is absolute is itself. In L. (S.) the majority of 
the Court conceded that, “from a philosophical standpoint, absolute 
neutrality does not exist”.84 Presumably this is a good thing, because 
“absolutes hardly have any place in the law”.85 And, of course, “no right 
is absolute”.86 
While the Court seemed to admire neutrality, even if it is always im-
perfect and never achieved, Deschamps J. explained that the law also 
dislikes absolutes. This makes sense, given that absolute neutrality does 
not exist. But she offered no explanation for what exists instead of 
absolute neutrality. Partial neutrality? Absolute partiality? We learn not 
whether any other absolutes could exist or be contemplated within the 
law, such as absolute belief. This was, in effect, the nature of the claim 
being asserted by the appellants in L. (S.). There was no way of slicing 
and dicing or recasting their interests: they simply believed that the 
course in question was harmful to their religious duty. 
In order to take on the challenge of absolute belief — how to negoti-
ate with a non-negotiable position — the Court adopted a novel approach 
that it described as “realistic and non-absolutist”.87 The purpose of 
this approach, it explained, was to assure state neutrality, a goal which 
the Court had already acknowledged is not always possible or perfect. 
The primary condition, according to the Court, was that “the Quebec 
government cannot set up an education system that favours or hinders 
any one religion or a particular vision of religion”.88 Religions and 
religious faith could only be taught as options, not as authority, and as 
                                                                                                             
83 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra, note 8, at 311-12. 
84 L. (S.), supra, note 9, at para. 31. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id., at para. 32. 
88 Id., at para. 37. 
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general principles, not as commandments. This is the non-absolutist 
approach — enforced agnosticism. 
Yet, promoting “neutrality” and non-absolutism led to the conclusion 
that there was no basis to exempt the appellants’ children from the 
course. Accommodation is not a free-standing right: it only arises where 
there is a verifiable adverse effect, and the Court saw no actual infringe-
ment of a freedom. The appellants thus found themselves bound by an 
inflexible rule enforcing mandatory secular instruction about religion. 
This sort of rule would appear to the religious absolutist to be favouring 
a “particular vision of religion” — namely, an agnostic or secular view 
that posits all religions as morally neutral and equally worthy of contem-
plation — precisely the kind of purpose the Court said government 
should be prevented from pursuing. While secular education about 
religion may seem “neutral” and unobjectionable to most people in the 
society, the effects for some individuals will manifest as an encroach-
ment on a fundamental aspect of their belief system. 
Aspiring to an impossible goal of perfect neutrality might be laud-
able and justifiable, but in practice it will always come with real costs. 
Being realistic in respect of an aspiration to an ideal does not mean 
ignoring potential adverse consequences; on the contrary, it requires 
creating mechanisms that account for the unequal consequences of 
neutral constructs. Problematizing neutrality, therefore, especially in the 
context of the rule of law, requires a full account of the risks and harms. 
The positions of the appellants and of the government in L. (S.) were 
remarkably symmetrical. The appellant’s claim was essentially based on 
the rejection of legitimate religious difference. For the appellants, the 
fact that people are free to belong to different religions in our society 
does not mean that the state should endorse the content of those differ-
ences, or promote them as equally legitimate. Any teaching of religion, 
from this view, would privilege a perspective on religion — in this case, 
a secular, humanistic ethical perspective — which, for some religious 
people, will be offensive. Veiling a particular (i.e., secular) perspective 
under the label of neutrality was, for the appellants, precisely what they 
argued leads to the infringement of their freedom to transmit their 
religion. The argument was essentially that there is value in the manner 
and context of instruction: no secular education system could ever teach 
religion in a manner equal to faith-based instruction. The exemption 
request, then, was to protect children from the corruption of non faith-
based instruction about religion. The fact of secular teaching itself was 
the alleged harm. 
136 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The Court would not find that secular teaching of religion, by defini-
tion, impedes a parents’ ability to transmit religion. It carefully avoided 
adopting an accommodation analysis. Accommodation arises precisely in 
such situations where neutral measures have an adverse effect on an 
individual or group. Here, the curriculum sought to give a secular 
treatment to religious and philosophical texts, privileging the state’s 
particular moral perspective, which was, a priori, in tension with the 
appellants’ moral perspective. 
The Court’s avoidance of accommodation is surprising given that it 
acknowledged that state neutrality is not absolute. It flows logically that, 
at times, there are effects of state non-neutrality that will have a signifi-
cant impact on certain individuals. Accommodation is what mitigates 
these adverse effects. Analogizing to the disability context, the recogni-
tion that the constructed world is not neutral gives rise to the duty to 
accommodate as a measure of fundamental protection against invidious 
harm.89 In the disability accommodation context, it is more obvious, 
conceptually speaking, that the physical world is constructed. No 
construction can be purely neutral, but, for example, in architecture 
“universal design” is an approach that pre-emptively mitigates many of 
the adverse effects of the constructed world on people with physical 
disabilities.90 Universal design reduces the need for accommodation, but 
it does not eliminate it. 
It is helpful to think about beliefs, morals and social norms as being, 
like physical spaces, constructed in a particular image. While “neutral” 
approaches seek to universalize across spectrums of difference, they 
cannot eliminate the potential for difference-based exclusion. Recall that 
the L. (S.) case began as a simple exemption request. The appellants had 
gone to the courts after reaching an impasse with the school board. They 
sought judicial review of the decision refusing to grant an exemption 
from the course. The appellants only later added claims of statutory 
breach and constitutional violation.91 In both the administrative review 
and the declaratory challenge, the parents were seeking the same remedy: 
                                                                                                             
89 See Michael Ashley Stein, “Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodation 
as Antidiscrimination” (2004) 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579. 
90 For example, the latest international human rights instrument, the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res. A/61/611 (2006), Art. 2, defines “universal design” as: 
“... the design of products, environments, programmes and services to be usable by all people, to the 
greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation or specialized design”. The Convention 
integrates both concepts of universal design and reasonable accommodation into its framework for 
disability rights enforcement. 
91 L. (S.) v. School Board of the Oaks, [2009] Q.J. No. 1896, 2009 QCCS 973 (Que. S.C.). 
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an exemption for their children from the mandatory class. Was it unrea-
sonable for the school board to refuse? Was it unconstitutional for the 
province to design an inflexible mandatory curricular program? 
The Court answered “no” to a different question altogether: it looked 
for evidence that a “neutral” program had done anything harmful, and 
found that it had not. That the Court did not employ an accommodation 
analysis may be due to the manner in which the case was pleaded by the 
appellants. This allowed the Court to avoid the formal structure of an 
individual freedom claim, and the inevitable impossibility of Amselem, 
and engage in a conceptual analysis of what freedom means in a 
society that has defined the common good in terms of diversity and 
multiculturalism.92 
VII. UNCONSTRAINED FREEDOM, HARM AND PROPORTIONALITY 
L. (S.) revealed that Amselem’s clarity about subjective and objective 
levels of analysis is fragile. An accommodation analysis, applied to the 
religion context, necessitates some objective review of the underlying 
belief that grounds virtually any claim to freedom. It is folly to imagine 
that a court can split (or expand) the pie if it does not know all the 
ingredients. While in theory, accommodation is a matter of legal reason-
ing, in practice it looks a lot more like bargaining, with courts and 
adjudicators weighing the competing interests when parties are unable to 
work it out for themselves. 
Accommodation, best conceived, creates conditions in which free-
dom can be enjoyed by all. It is, at its core, a mechanism for combatting 
discrimination. As a result of the historical and philosophical background 
of religious rights in Canada, described above, equality of religious 
practice is intertwined with freedom of religious practice.93 Under 
accommodation analysis, where individual restrictions are necessary, the 
                                                                                                             
92 Though the Court did not invoke s. 27, the multiculturalism provision of the Charter, 
these passages suggest that the authority of s. 27 is interpretive in nature. But the extent of its 
interpretive power appears to include defining foundational, normative frameworks that constrain the 
substantive content of Charter rights and freedoms. See, generally Faisal Bhabha, “Navigating the 
Spheres of Multiculturalism, Bilingualism and Federalism: Theoretical, Doctrinal and Constitutional 
Perspectives on the ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ Debate” (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d) 499, at 517-26. 
93 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Mariah Zeisberg, “Religious Freedom in Canada and the 
United States” (2006) 4 Int’l J. Const. L. 262 [hereinafter “Eisgruber & Zeisberg”]. 
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undue hardship analysis protects against arbitrary deprivation.94 One 
conception of freedom, as explored in Part II, rationalizes such non-
arbitrary deprivations, not in the form of exceptions or limits, but rather 
as a function of creating conditions of equality that enhance freedom. 
After all, accommodation is a form of redistribution: it usually involves 
taking from one to give to another. This is why basing an accommodation 
claim solely on a belief — creating entitlements vis-à-vis others — can 
be fraught in practice. 
There is consequently tremendous pressure on courts and tribunals to 
present strong justifications for enforcing accommodation rights. The 
challenge is that, as Pettit tells us, freedom is a zero-sum game.95 The 
promise of liberal constitutionalism of freedom for all can only be, in 
practice, an assurance of relative freedom. Accommodation begins from 
the assumption that absolute freedom is the goal, subject to limits that we 
encounter when one person’s freedom (e.g., A’s preferred hours of work) 
bumps into another person’s freedom (e.g., B’s scheduling needs). As 
suggested earlier, accommodation analysis often operates as a bargain 
between these “competing” freedoms. When negotiating accommodation 
fails to yield a result, courts and tribunals are called upon to adjudicate. 
This puts decision-makers in the position of weighing the value of the 
competing claims. Yet, current religious freedom doctrine does not permit 
substantive review of the content of claimants’ religious beliefs. Decision-
makers, then, must find ways to do it covertly, most likely under 
considerations of “harm” and in “proportionality” balancing exercises.96 
                                                                                                             
94 In Renaud, supra, note 34, at 984, Sopinka J. made clear that there is no absolute protec-
tion: “The use of the term ‘undue’ infers that some hardship is acceptable; it is only ‘undue’ hardship 
that satisfies this test.” 
95 Pettit, supra, note 12, at 52. 
96 Bruker, supra, note 71, at paras. 17-20. Facing the issue head-on, Abella J. explained: 
... any harm to the husband’s religious freedom in requiring him to pay damages for 
unilaterally breaching his commitment, is significantly outweighed by the harm caused 
by his unilateral decision not to honour it. 
This is not, as implied by the dissent, an unwarranted secular trespass into religious 
fields, nor does it amount to judicial sanction of the vagaries of an individual’s religion. 
In deciding cases involving freedom of religion, the courts cannot ignore religion. To 
determine whether a particular claim to freedom of religion is entitled to protection, a 
court must take into account the particular religion, the particular religious right, and the 
particular personal and public consequences, including the religious consequences, of 
enforcing that right. 
See also Reference re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2211, 2011 
BCSC 1588, at para. 5 (B.C.S.C.). Considering the criminal prohibition on polygamy: “I have 
concluded that this case is essentially about harm; more specifically, Parliament’s reasoned 
apprehension of harm arising out of the practice of polygamy. This includes harm to women, to 
children, to society and to the institution of monogamous marriage.” 
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For example, if a party were to make a claim based on an absolutist 
though sincere religious belief, the courts would have no choice but to 
either reject the belief itself as objectionable, necessarily requiring an 
objective evaluation of a subjective religious belief, or to concede the 
breach and build a justification at section 1. It is not fantastical to 
imagine any number of claims based on beliefs relating to interactions 
with others or others’ ideas that could necessitate this sort of analysis. In 
L. (S.), the Court avoided section 1; instead, it was able to frame the 
appellants’ belief in a way which put it outside the definition of the 
freedom itself: a conceptual, rather than practical, limit. While, in this 
case, the Court was able to frame the appellants’ belief in a way which 
allowed for a very fine carving of the sincere belief test, future cases will 
likely cause the Amselem test to crumble under the weight of these 
analytical challenges. 
Accommodation derives from a theory in which freedom is, concep-
tually, limitless. Freedom only reaches its limit when it interferes with, or 
draws from, others. But what does it mean to draw from others? This is 
where the doctrine of undue hardship is designed to sort facts and, 
through the analytical mechanism of proportionality, weigh the compet-
ing interests. The analysis is designed with an expectation of conflict: 
infinite freedom will always collide with the finite world. While most 
Charter and human rights jurisprudence treats health, safety and cost 
considerations as “hardship”, it is a general theory of harm, measured by 
effects on people, that underlies the undue hardship test.97 
Cases involving claims of conscience and religion will often trigger 
concerns about harmful values. As Eisgruber and Zeisberg point out, 
“harm” as “conflict-with-values” has been a part of religious rights 
discourse since the seminal Big M case,98 in which Dickson J. (as he then 
was) defined freedom in a way which simultaneously permits and 
restricts: 
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary 
to his beliefs or his conscience.99 
                                                                                                             
97 See Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard 
Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), at 1, 2. 
98 Eisgruber & Zeisberg, supra, note 93, at 262. 
99 Big M, supra, note 35, at para. 95. 
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Accommodation claims invariably, therefore, bring up balancing, 
pitting harms against claims or benefits. Balancing as an adjudicative 
exercise is challenging: it aspires to achieve compromise by identifying 
and organizing all of the relevant interests at stake. In so doing, the 
courts must translate a religious obligation from a faith-based commit-
ment into a form of legally protected expressive activity. In so doing, the 
courts must necessarily explain and rationalize the particularities of the 
religious commitment.100 
Berger argues that, under the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
over the past decade, the Canadian constitutional law’s image of religion 
is best understood as being essentially individual, serving autonomy and 
choice, and concerned with private interests.101 With the adoption of the 
Charter, the conception of freedom of religion within an individual rights 
paradigm tore people out of their communities and social groups, and 
individualized their interests. At the same time, it created an artificial 
bifurcation of religious people’s identities, split between private and 
public/collective expressions.102 Berger notes that the contemporary 
“rendering” of religion included a descriptive account that is not value-
neutral. Rather, courts have decided, apparently on their own accord, that 
what counts as “religious” (and therefore deserving of protection) is only 
“that which is meaningful to the individual; institutions and collective 
traditions are only of derivative importance to the law.”103 
Another feature of religion that the Court has rendered is the way 
religions ought to interact, which naturally requires interrogating the 
place of outsiders from within the religious perspective (such as being 
“apostates”, “sinners” or “heathens”). The Court simply washes over 
these perspectives and substitutes a presumed, or imputed, view based on 
mutual respect and tolerance. While many religions — perhaps any 
religion, by definition — may contain core exclusionary doctrines, may 
lend itself to absolutist positions, and may not be open to compromise on 
fundamental tenets, the Court has woven religious freedom tightly with 
the protection of diversity in its interpretive dicta. It appears the Court is 
signalling that there can be no basis for a religious freedom claim if it is 
grounded in a view (even, dare we say, a “sincerely held belief”) that 
                                                                                                             
100 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra, note 8. 
101 Id., at 283. 
102 Donn Short & Bruce MacDougall, “Religion-Based Claims for Impinging on Queer 
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significantly opposes or threatens the values of diversity and cultural 
pluralism. 
VIII. REFINING THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
The Supreme Court’s decision in L. (S.) suggests that nearly 30 years 
after O’Malley, the Court is grappling with the implications of applying 
the accommodation approach to the adjudication of religious freedom 
claims, whether under the Charter or anti-discrimination statutes. Nearly 
60 years after Saumur, the Court is again compelled to revisit the concept 
of freedom in the context of the relationship between religion, the state 
and society. 
L. (S.) certainly constrains the individual rights approach to freedom 
of religion. The Court did not call upon the government to justify a 
“limit”; rather, the Court tailored the scope of the freedom in such a way 
that there was no restriction at all. A robust accommodation analysis 
would have difficulty sustaining the Court’s conclusion: while the 
restriction complained about may not have been arbitrary — given that 
the program applied equally to everybody and contained “neutral” (i.e., 
agnostic) content — it clearly had some adverse effect on the appellant. 
The dissent was less cagey about this fact, but found that the risk of 
adverse impact was speculative. 
Looking at L. (S.) in the bigger picture, the facts were relatively easy. 
The claimant was not a member of a vulnerable minority, but rather of 
the former dominant majority:104 white, French-speaking Catholics in 
Quebec. Even more relevant is the institutional history of the Roman 
Catholic church and Quebec’s education system and entire social 
structure. The Court acknowledged this history, and emphasized Que-
bec’s deliberate move to secular public education in the 1960s. The 
curricular program at issue was part of a distinctive, Québécois relation-
ship between religion and society, and the Court seemed eager to dovetail 
its analysis with its rendition of Quebec’s history. 
Nonetheless, the L. (S.) decision does offer some further develop-
ment to religious freedom jurisprudence generally. Secular diversity 
appears to have replaced the “equality of religions” as the governing 
                                                                                                             
104 It must be noted that this “majoritarian” dominance was not enjoyed equally. The privi-
leged status of Catholicism in Quebec was held firmly by religious institutions who were cozy with 
government until the Duplessis era ended in 1959. In terms of economic power, French-speaking 
Catholics in Quebec were, for most of their history under English rule, a disadvantaged majority. 
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norm of religious freedom. This is a shift away from respect for 
differences in religious doctrine, belief and practice, and towards an 
identity-based discourse rooted in the recognition of “culture”. As a 
sociological statement, it reflects the secularization of the general public, 
the de-privileging of religion in public life, and a reconstruction of 
principles of social cohesion. The jurisprudence of diversity and multi-
culturalism could very well be the contemporary expression of communi-
tarian and constitutional goals, filling the normative gaps left by the 
demise of majoritarian faith communities. This could be the dawn of a 
new republicanism. 
There is something to be gained by having constitutional law and 
democratic theory interacting in judicial decision-making. It is useful for 
courts and adjudicators to explain in their reasons what values underlie 
their interpretations of the law. Through such reasoned decisions, 
decision-makers give meaning and content not only to rights, but also to 
civic identity. While the state aspires to neutrality in mediating between 
competing private interests, the law need not be (and is never, in fact) 
neutral in every instance. We already recognize this with the concept of 
the “public interest”, which in adjudication becomes the doctrine used to 
promote what is generally held to be the “common good”. The courts 
impliedly tell us what the common good is, and sometimes they outright 
say it. More detailed attention to explaining and theorizing these doc-
trines will provide greater stability in the law. 
There is, however, also reason to be skeptical about universalizing 
concepts like the “common good” or the “public interest”. We approach 
such concepts with caution because we are aware of the risk of interest 
domination and usurpation by a strong few to the detriment of the rest. 
Extreme examples of fascist and socialist states immediately come to 
mind, illustrating how tyranny (i.e., the concentration of political power 
with little popular legitimacy) has been justified on the basis of “public” 
or “common” interests. In fact, justifications based on common interests 
have been the hallmark of most if not all of the regimes that we view as 
totalitarian. 
The risk of sliding into totalitarianism is not an immediate or neces-
sary concern for Canada, at present. Rather, the risk in a democracy 
committed to equality is that public interests come to be defined with 
inadequate attention to the interests at the margins, those who arguably 
need the protection of law the most. When accepted applications of the 
common good fail to deliver, substantively, more egalitarian outcomes 
over the span of time, if not in each and every case, there is reason to 
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worry about breakdown in the system of legitimate democratic govern-
ance. The legitimacy of the democratic system and the rule of law thus 
hinges on the pursuit of democratic egalitarianism against the threats of 
elite domination and unchecked majoritarianism,105 which together leave 
society’s weakest in peril. 
The courts are the guardians of the constitutional aspiration: judges 
find and give meaning to the statements of goals and principles that are 
embodied in constitutional law. Similarly, human rights legislation is not 
self-executing: statutory tribunals must hear and decide, giving meaning 
to the words of the statute in respect of the matters brought to adjudica-
tion. Rights and freedoms are therefore defined in practice, on the facts 
of particular cases. For this reason, decision-makers must explain how 
their conclusions respect and uphold the democratic egalitarian principle 
of non-domination, in particular when considering the “public interest” 
or other doctrines grounded in the “common good”. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper endeavoured to expose a theoretical gap in the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to freedom of religion 
claims. The Court engages in decision-making about contested values, 
but has tended to avoid substantive consideration of normative questions. 
Instead, it has preferred formalistic doctrinal applications coupled with 
covert content review, whereby normative assessments are made in the 
name of a stretched and contrived neutrality. I have suggested that a shift 
in the theoretical paradigm could find some justification within a neo-
republican democratic model. This model would conceptualize religious 
freedom as involving group and relational interests, and recognizing 
social encumbrances. Such a conception of freedom would dismiss the 
impulse to emphasize individual non-interference as the defining or only 
characteristic of freedom. Instead, it would view freedom as a fixed 
resource that must be distributed fairly and equitably throughout the 
society. Rejection of hyper-individualism suggests that responsibility and 
social commitments ought to be understood as a constituent part of 
freedom, rather than as a threat or toll. Freedom, in this light, would be 
viewed as a shared commodity that both gives and takes. 
                                                                                                             
105 This sort of “soft” domination is best theorized in the work of Marxist political philoso-
pher Antonio Gramsci. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by 
Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1991), at 12-22. 
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One of the primary functions of law is to set the permissions and re-
strictions that regulate access to, and use of, any shared commodity, 
including freedom. Political philosophers have grappled with the fact that 
the realization of freedom needs more than mere permission:106 the 
promotion of religious freedom requires some degree of state or institu-
tional action to create the conditions that will allow full freedom to 
flourish in an egalitarian fashion. This means that freedom is as much 
about managing the kinds of interactions people have with each other, 
with the state and with other social institutions, as it is about offering a 
vehicle to individual autonomy. Rights and freedoms, understood within 
the relational context of this system of permissions and restrictions, 
incorporate both the respect for personal autonomy and the requirement 
that personal autonomy be exercised reasonably, fairly and responsibly. 
Democratic legitimacy demands at least serious efforts to promote 
egalitarianism. Coercion or restriction in the promotion of legitimate 
Charter goals cannot, on their own, breach the Charter. The Charter 
cannot breach itself. This is a matter of fact, not interpretation. One right 
cannot extinguish another. From this view, the normative content of 
freedom is shaped concurrently by individual interests in autonomy and 
self-realization, and collective goals, to ensure equality and social 
harmony. These two threads are equally necessary to promote freedom, 
though all too often they are pitted against one another, especially when 
subject to adjudication. Conceptually, the social permission of freedom 
should, in each case, be evaluated against a generally held (though not 
necessarily universal) notion of the common good. While there is not, in 
any realistic sense, a neutral standard (“neutrality does not exist”107), 
democratic processes help to ensure that the values underlying the law 
and institutional behaviour will bear the imprimatur of wide popular 
consent, and have the widest and deepest benefit to society. 
This is the basic framework for a relational conception of freedom 
— one in which permissions and restrictions flow in all directions 
between the state, the individual and the collective. The task for the 
Supreme Court, then, is to develop a legal understanding of religious 
freedom that is shaped in relation to expressions of the common good. 
The sources for ascertaining the common good include instruments of 
law and policy, but will also inevitably contain moral judgment. Courts 
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should ensure that principles of democratic egalitarianism and non-
arbitrariness are respected in order to maintain democratic legitimacy. In 
other words, the role of the Court is to be the protector of these values as 
part of its function of interpreting the law. 
In Bruker, the Supreme Court of Canada described the pride of Can-
ada’s growing appreciation for, and protection of, difference. Respect for 
difference appears to be an ethical principle, as opposed to a “right” or a 
“law”. Yet, it underlies Canada’s constitutional structure and defines 
Canadian identity. Justice Abella explained that: 
Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for diversity 
and pluralism. This journey has included a growing appreciation for 
multiculturalism, including the recognition that ethnic, religious or 
cultural differences will be acknowledged and respected. Endorsed in 
legal instruments ranging from the statutory protections found in 
human rights codes to their constitutional enshrinement in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to integrate into 
Canada’s mainstream based on and notwithstanding these differences 
has become a defining part of our national character.108 
The ethical principle of respecting difference apparently gives rise to 
a “right” to integrate, though the precise source of this right is unclear. 
This “defining part of our national character” may have foretold the story 
of L. (S.). While we may assume a generalized right to integrate vis-à-vis 
the state implied in the equality guarantee, this “right” suggests obliga-
tions on the part of others stemming from mutual respect for difference 
among citizens. What this speaks to is a value of diversity tolerance that 
defines the social space in which rights and freedoms exist. In other 
words, the respect for difference speaks not only to government, but to 
everyone. It sets the context in which rights and freedoms are defined. 
Justice Abella explained respect for difference not as a limiting 
principle based on governmental needs and objectives, but rather as a 
nuanced rights definition based on specific facts and context: 
The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean that 
those differences are always hegemonic. Not all differences are 
compatible with Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all 
barriers to their expression are arbitrary. Determining when the 
assertion of a right based on difference must yield to a more pressing 
public interest is a complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies 
bright-line application. It is, at the same time, a delicate necessity for 
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protecting the evolutionary integrity of both multiculturalism and 
public confidence in its importance.109 
Here is a conceptual limit on freedom: not all differences are com-
patible with Canada’s values. It seems, then, that the Court is saying that 
the “right” to integrate is paired with an unconditional principle — an 
obligation — of belonging, or at least an obligation of conforming to 
certain core values. If so, this creates boundless possibility for how the 
Court may identify and apply such core values. Based on recent religious 
freedom doctrine, including the cases surveyed in this paper, it appears 
that the Court is developing a theory of religious freedom that is defined 
and shaped by the normative priority of respecting difference in a 
multicultural society, coupled with a concomitant duty of belonging to an 
integrated society. If, indeed, this is the course, then further illumination 
can be expected from the Court’s judgments in S. (N.) and Whatcott,110 
which are both due imminently. Until then, it is worth thinking about 
what a relational theory of freedom might mean for the other section 2 
rights, as well as to what extent this analysis might enhance our under-
standing of the theory of equality reflected in the Supreme Court’s 
section 15 jurisprudence. 
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